From Mass Parties to Cartel Parties:
The Evolution of the Structure of Political Parties in Greece through Changes in their Statutes and Systems of Financing

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The Legal Regulation of Political Parties
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Introduction

There is a phrase in the history of party sociology that was put forward about sixty years ago and is still valid today: "Modern parties are much less determined by their program or by the class origin of their supporters, as compared to the nature of their organization" (Duverger, 1976: 20).

This sophisticated and pioneering observation by Maurice Duverger was made at a time when the prevailing view stated that political parties are primarily determined by their electoral base and their political program, rather than by their organization. However, already back then, their organizational crystallization and internal function tended to over-determine their political character and dominate over their electoral or programmatic imprints. The most tangible example of this trend was found in the (third-worldist) communist parties, whose program and structure of their electoral base were over-determined by the (qualitative) characteristics of their bureaucratic organization.

Duverger re-introduces the analysis of the parties’ organizational structure and bureaucracy into the theoretical debate over the political parties - after the early politico-scientific analyses by Moisei Ostrogorski (1902/1979) and Robert Michels (1911/1971) - appearing “prophetic” as far as the evolution of the form of political parties in the following decades is concerned, foreseeing and analyzing the “instrumental” management of the mass organizations of the parties. By setting his classic division between “cadre parties” and “mass parties”, he underlines the fact that this division “does not concern their size, i.e. the number of their members. It is not a difference in size, but rather a difference in structure” (Duverger, 1976: 119-120).

Several years later, even before putting forward their thesis on ‘cartel party’, Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1992, 1993) spoke of the ‘three faces’ of party organization, which, in reality, correspond to three different forms of material appearance of the parties: the party as voluntary membership organisation, the party as governing organisation, and the party as bureaucratic organisation. These three ‘faces’ coexist in all modern mass parties, reflecting the informal breakup of the unity of an organization in different function that are often mutually impermeable. Moreover, they reflect differentiations and correlations of forces in the interior of the parties, associated with the various priorities held by each of the three ‘faces’.

The journey between 1951’s Duverger and 1992’s Katz and Mair is long and, in many (national) cases, complex and contradictory. Let us follow it closely, in order to better link European reality to the recent reality of political changeover in Greece after 1974.

In the final analysis, the ‘political party’ in post-war Europe of the extended social state is the outcome of a balance between ‘representation’ and ‘legitimation’. The concept of the political party is founded on the formation of two more specific notions: a) relations of representation and b) relations of legitimization. The first concept (‘relations of representation’) approaches the process of the founding-formation and reproduction of the ‘representational element’ of parties based on the historical analysis of each specific period and each specific historical formation. The second concept (‘relations of legitimisation’) describes the process with which a political party is incorporated into the institutional context of the state and either attempts to set up its relations of representation as ‘state policy’, or subjects the relations of representation to the state, essentially functioning as a vehicle for the legitimization of state policies within the society through the exploitation of its mass dimension. These two concepts refer to the
circumstances under which the party phenomenon emerged and evolved. Parties were born and developed as subjects for the entrance of the masses at the epicentre of the political process, expressing great social divisions and demands (process of the organization of representation) (Weber, 1959; Duverger, 1976; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). In the post-war decades, however, they evolved into institutional tools for the 'limitation' of the masses in 'given contexts', in order to serve concurrently the function of political representation and the registering of (certain) social interests in the state, as well as the reproduction of the given socio-political system and its extended political legitimization. Some approaches place emphasis on the analysis of parties as institutions of mediation between the society and the government-state (Lawson, 1976; Sartori, 1976), others on their function as institutions of 'interest harmonisation' in the context of governance (Almond & Powell, 1967; Scarrow, 1996).

An interesting historical element in the development of political parties (including the systemic ruling parties) was the fact that this dual property-incorporation did not prevent them from 'representing' differing social interests, having differing or even opposing political strategies, and seeking to rise to power in order to put in practice a program that in a way 'obeyed' to their social commitment. Broadly speaking, this was the course followed by European political parties and, especially, by the two great ruling 'groups' of the reformist Left (in the form of either social democracy or labour parties) and the Right (in the form of either Christian-democratic parties or conservative, or even liberal parties).

However, this balance starts to gradually crumble from the end of 1970s onwards. The neoliberal ideologies win the battle of ideas, initially within the parties of the Right and Centre-Right, and later also within the wider reformist Left. The ideas of social protection and solidarity, public interest and state intervention in general start to sound 'old-fashioned'. Within a context of theoretical and political redefinitions, the social-democratic party family transforms into 'Centre-Left' or 'Euro-Left'. On the other hand, the conservative Right detaches itself from statist 'conservatism', opens itself to the 'new ideas' of the market and is dominated by the 'neoliberal Centre-Right'. Gradually, a broader consensus is built in the field of economy and state policies; one of its immediate effects is the tendency of polarized party systems to be substituted by centripetal ones, following the notion by Giovanni Sartori (1976), and the tendency of old centripetal systems to become even more consensual and with greater convergences between the ruling parties.

Thus, gradually, the political parties of the later period - the period that begins after 1989 - cease to be the outcome of the balance between the two relations and function unilaterally as a component of the process of political legitimization of the policies of the state, a state whose character and function also get to gradually change. gets to gradually change its character and function.

Needless to say that this transformation of the political parties does not occur abruptly. By studying his contemporary party phenomenon in mid-1960s, Otto Kirchheimer (1966) had foreseen the ideological convergence of the ruling parties and their effort to function more as organization supplying the electoral market with a political programme,¹ rather than as collective intellectuals seeking to unify a bloc of

¹ Michel Offerlé (1987) elaborated on this position put forward by Kirchheimer, introducing the concept of 'parti-enterprise', a concept which bore Weberian influences. According to Offerlé, the
homogeneous (converging) collective interests. The ‘ideological formation’ type of party was being gradually replaced by the ‘inclusive’ type of party with lax and contradictory ideologies as well as with ‘flexible’ political programs.

Adopting a similar theoretical approach, Leon Epstein (1967) noted that, despite the fact that the ‘mass party’ had prevailed as a model for both the left-wing and right-wing parties, its social utility had been reduced and that, eventually, mass accession to it was oriented more towards electoral success rather than representation.

Obviously, the occurrence of such a transformation entailed certain effects. By withdrawing from their ‘obligation’ to ‘account’ to their social base and hold ideological positions, and thus political goals, and by prioritizing electoral ‘victory’ over any other goal (a kind of an end in itself that satisfies solely their organizational bureaucracy), political parties - and we refer primarily to the ruling parties or to those parties that adopted a discourse of rule - transform gradually into what has been termed as an ‘electoral professional party’ (Panebianco, 1988). Angelo Panebianco extends the observations made by Kirchheimer and Epstein, focusing more on issues of functional organization of parties and stating that contemporary ruling parties differ from typical ‘mass parties’ (i.e. the somewhat older parties) in their dependence from ‘politics professionals’, the use of new forms and techniques of communication and the strengthening of the role of their leadership, which becomes more and more autonomous from the ‘base’, its processes and its ideologies. Consequently, he claimed that the term ‘electoral-professional party’ is preferable to - or more complete than - the term ‘inclusive party’, because it places emphasis on the ‘professional’ (as opposed to the previous ‘volunteer’) characteristics of the party and underlines the basic, formally organizational difference between the old ‘mass party’ and the respective new party form.

There are two important elements in all of the aforementioned theoretical approaches to the party phenomenon. First, a critique - or, an overcoming of Duverger’s theoretical scheme with respect to parties (‘cadre parties / mass parties’) - is founded, based on the evolution of the party phenomenon in a different context, that of the incorporation of political representation. Second, the ‘mass party’ begins to be understood as a ‘tool’ for the function of the political system and especially for the ‘provision’ of legitimization, a position later elaborated by the theory of ‘cartel party’. In other words, a ‘type’ of party is formed that ends up surviving only as a ‘state body’ because, due to the recession of the element of social representation, it is impossible for this party to perform its main ‘regime’ function, i.e. the articulation of interests in the context of the state (Almond & Powell, 1967).

Indeed, the “instrumentalisation” of the party was the main process of transformation of a representative collective structure, as was historically the emergence of parties. The “party” as a functional tool of state mechanism is a catalyzing development in the history of the forms of representation in contemporary bourgeois democracies. The effect in party structure and in the political function of (party) organization is observed in many variants: concentration of party power, reduced qualitative and quantitative participation of the party base and restriction of its range of influence, political autonomisation of the top levels, impermeability of the party space within which decisions are taken, top-down control of the political personnel that is called upon to staff party and state structures, economic dependence on the state. The scheme of the three
faces' of party organization by Katz and Mair displays in a sophisticated manner the division of the organic unity between the form and the party, not only in three distinct 'functions', but also in three 'beams' of unequal and diverging circles of interests, a division that transforms the 'party' from an institution of representation to a mechanism that is determined from the outside by the state and by its administrative bureaucracy. This reality is described with the notion of 'cartel party' by Katz and Mair. The 'cartel party' is a 'mass state party' but, apart from that, it is also a system of 'similar parties' that control power and the political system imposing some kind of 'political representation cartel'. The 'classic mass party' is a party of social representation, i.e. a party of the civil society (Katz & Mair, 1995: 8). On the contrary, the 'state mass party' or 'cartel party' is a party that strictly moves within the context set by the state and is characterized by the state-party interpenetration (Poulantzas, 1982: 334-339. Katz & Mair, 1995: 17). The direction of the two 'party types' is reverse: the first type moves 'bottom-up', while the second moves 'top-down'.

This type of party is based on the de-ideologised and politically fluid social alliance between diverging interests, which characterizes the “inclusive” or “electoral professional party”. It is also directly connected to the “undifferentiated party system”, a party system without contradictions, or at least without serious fundamental contradictions, given that its motion is characterized by the convergence of the policies of the power poles.

The post-1974 type of ‘mass party’ in Greece. A periodisation of the post-1974 party type

The politico-organisational evolution of the Greek political parties from the political changeover of 1974 until today is essentially divided into three periods:

The first period extends from 1974 (fall of dictatorship - restoration of democracy) up until 1981. This is a formative period for contemporary political parties, in which they get to be set up and established as solid political entities. It is the period of 'participatory party democracy'. Parties are ‘occupied’ by the masses, which demand a new type of political participation and co-formulation of political decisions. Parties are elevated to the central and almost exclusive institution for the organization of political representation (taking into account the virtual inexistence of labour unions, employers' associations, local government, and other institutions of political representation in general) and are institutionally empowered due to this very same enlarged political participation. At the same time, this period is a phase of internal struggle, summed up in a key dilemma: would the Greek parties post-1974 take the form of a ‘mass party’ or that of a ‘party of the masses’?

This is not about playing with words, but rather about the main contradiction embedded in every mass formation. The first form of party refers to the 'institutional-bureaucratic' mechanism that utilises its powerful organizational structure for the fulfilment of own interests and exploits the mass element in order to strengthen its role and its bargaining capacity. The second form of party refers to a flexible and malleable tool at the disposal of its members and of society, a tool that functions not as a bureaucratic structure but rather as a collective intellectual who is in support of social interests and acts as their programmatic unifier. If, in the beginning of the post-war decades, the organizational types of parties were divided - as analysed masterfully by Duverger - into 'mass parties' and 'cadre parties' (which broadly corresponded to parties of the Left and parties of the Right respectively), in the decades that followed the
Duvergerian antithesis was going to be transformed in ‘mass parties’ and in ‘parties of the masses’, since the generalization of political representation rendered all parties mass ones, be it on the left or on the right.

In post-1974 Greece, the struggle between the ‘mass party’ and the ‘party of the masses’ intensely characterised the parties and groups of the Left, and PASOK in particular, which - being a more recent radical political entity - originated from processes of social self-organisation in 1974 and was animated by profound movement characteristics; this is the reason why it was plagued with fierce internal conflicts until it reached the form of ‘mass party’.²

The second period extends from 1981 (rise of PASOK to power) until 1996. This is the period when the two main ruling parties, ND (Centre-Right) and PASOK (Centre-Left) form competing relations of representation with different ideologies, social alliances and party strategies, setting the boundaries of a ‘polarised two-party system’. We shall call this period a period of ‘consensual party democracy’. Political parties tend towards the form of ‘mass party’ and the element of legitimization prevails over the element of representation. The shaping and development of a typical ‘mass party’ organization by the party of Greek Centre-Right, ND, contributes decisively to the evolution of this form of parties. After 1981, ND places emphasis on its organization and incorporates all types of ‘left’ organizational-party ideal-type (base organizations, pyramid-like hierarchy, sectoral organizations, trade-union party groups, etc.), having established from the start the character and structure of ‘bureaucratic mass party’ where political tops are separated and autonomous while mass presence is utilized as a mechanism for the social legitimization of the key choices.³

Finally, the third period extends from 1996 until today (we may place a symbolic borderline in 2010, the year of the entry of Greece into the Support Mechanism of IMF and the EU, which produces a radical repositioning within the party system). It is the period in which a convergence of the two ruling parties is achieved, with respect to the form and essence of governmental policies as well as to their politico-organisational forms. It could be described as the era of consensual or converging two-party system, characterized by the transformation of ruling parties into ‘state parties’ and of the political system into a power cartel of two ‘political monopolies’. Ruling parties are definitively disassociated from their party base and, more broadly, from the social relations of representation on which they had been formed. They are entirely transformed into subsystems of the State and of its organic policies. We may call this period the period of ‘crisis of party democracy’.

We can a posteriori accept that the politico-organisational model of ND as a ‘party of the state’ or a party of legitimization prevailed in the rest of the parties and especially in PASOK, despite the fact that, initially, ND was the one adopting the form of the mass representation party. With respect to the two ruling parties - and especially PASOK - note

² For this special period of intense intra-party conflicts in the history of PASOK, see Spourdalakis (1988), Vernardakis (1995).
³ The history of ‘mass bourgeois parties’ in the entire Europe, and beyond, shows that, on the one hand, these parties followed the formation of mass labour organizations (trade-unions and parties), constituting in a way the response of the bourgeois classes to the social mobilization of their class opponents and that, on the other hand, they never became the primary centre for the organization of ‘bourgeois hegemony’, i.e. they never substituted the (bourgeois) state in that role.
that during the period under examination, and in stark contrast to practice up until then, no serious and significant political decision gets to be produced or proposed by the party organs (Conference, Central Committee or National Council, Executive Office). Party organs only discuss formalities, if and when they assemble, and are essentially transformed into electoral mobilization mechanisms.

The addition of the mass element in parties, parallel to their constitutional recognition and their incorporation into the institutional system of governance, became a key argument of the dominant - but also stereotypical - political discourse over their qualitative democratization, primarily when compared to the pre-dictatorship parties. However, as a "cunning of history", the mass element of an organization in quantitative terms does not necessarily go hand in hand with the deepening of democracy, democratic processes and social control. Similarly, the mass element of Greek post-1974 parties did not keep up with the democratization of their organizational functions or with the more active participation of citizens in political activities. Mass participation in parties coincided with their bureaucratic-centralist evolution, with the production of a (uncontrolled from the party base) leading ruling class and, surely, with the process of downgrading social relations of representation. The parties, while being mass ones, were transformed into mechanisms of state legitimization, downgrading their representative side. The qualitative shrinkage of democratic participation facilitated the conversion of parties into 'mass tools' of state legitimization. In this sense, after completing a historical cycle, 'mass parties' return to a peculiar character of a 'mass party of cadres', within which the 'mass' character is constantly reduced and the 'cadre' character constantly strengthened.

The 'open election' of the President: The institutional completion of the end of the representative mass party

The process of 'de-representationalisation' of the political parties was completed in Greece in the early years of the 2000s with the establishment-institutionalisation in the ruling parties (PASOK-ND) of the direct election of the President from the 'society'. Until then, the President was elected by the party Conference and the elected conference members that participated in it. The so-called 'open election' constitutes the statutory act of the completion of the submission of the representative element of the parties.

The first application of this model took place in 2004 in PASOK, when Giorgos Papandreou was elected in the presidency of the party, being the sole candidate. This process repeated itself in 2007, with Evangelos Venizelos and Costas Skandalidis standing

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4 In Greece, the 'political party' was recognized for the first time as a constitutional institution by the constitutional legislator of 1975. The Constitution of 1975 articulates a basic framework for the organization and action of the parties, recognizing institutionally the role of the 'party' in the broadening of the legitimacy of the state and its policies.

5 Participation in political parties (partisanship) was on average registered in the 1980s at around 760.000 persons, in the 1990s at 630.000, in the 2000s at 630.000 as well, and in the period 2009-2010 at 580.000. The members of ND reached 500.000 in 1985-1986 and then their number stabilized from the mid-1990s up until 2010 at about 350.000. Membership of PASOK peaked (220.000) in the early 1980s, and from the 1990s onwards it was consolidated at approximately 150.000 with fluctuations. The two parties of the Left have a steady partisanship of a total number of approximately 60.000 members (45.000 for KKE and 15.000 for SYN).
as opponents to the candidacy of G. Papandreou. In ND, this process was applied for the first time in November 2009, under the pressure of the similar process in PASOK, with the candidacies of Antonis Samaras, Dora Bakogianni and Panayotis Psomiadis. In fact, in 2010, ND extended the application of this process to its party Youth, ONNED, with the open election of its President.

The direct election of a President with an open voting by members and ‘friends’ of the party constitutes in a way a ‘deterministic’ evolution of the ‘mass post-1974 party’. This process keeps the mass element, while widening the passive mode of participation even further. It establishes a type and a process of election that is devoid of any classical principle of the democratic process, such as organised deliberation and accountability, the binding nature of the political agreement between the voluntarily organised members, and the collective nature of decisions. Moreover, the process for electing the President is delinked from the elections of the other party organs (Central Committees, Political Councils, etc.), so that the cadres’ anthropogeography also gets to be directly or indirectly subordinated to the interests and the circle of the President. The mass ‘open’ voting assists neither substantive participation, nor co-decision or political control, or even the creation of counterweights to the concentration of power.

The open election of the President was advertised as a kind of ‘democratic integration’ of the parties. However, is the direct election of the President from the electoral base a truly democratic development?

Contrary to whatever is seemingly registered, the establishment of direct open election contributed even further to the shrinkage of the representative character of the parties and restricted stiflingly the essence and form of (intraparty) democracy. More specifically, the process of direct election brought about the following changes:

Firstly, it depoliticised and liquidified even more the constitution of parties. Overcoming the bureaucratic mechanism was the pretext; in reality, the process functioned towards the direction of even greater autonomisation of party leaderships from the organised collectivity of the base. While the ‘traditional party’ formulates, through its theoretically coordinated processes, a framework of political and ideological principles that ‘bind’ the leadership, open election takes place on the basis of vague and abstract stakes, without programmatic commitments and without the establishment of a cadre structure through this structure. The leader of the party is freed at all levels, ceasing to be an ‘organ’ of the party and becoming himself the ‘party’. In addition, party bureaucracy and party elite are released from the constraints of the party base, are not accountable to it anymore - not even formally - and are thus left to the influence and pressure of non-party interests of whatever nature.

Secondly, apart from formal, the participation of the organized base is rendered useless, since whoever ‘mobilizes’ or wishes to participate in the direct election can do so. The party ceases to constitute a voluntary union of individuals with common ideology and common goals and becomes a political form without internal bonds, and without bonds

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6 It should be noted that there is a difference between the two parties that introduced the ‘open’ mode of presidential election: PASOK has recognized in its statute the capacity of ‘the ‘friend’ of the party, whose vote carries the exact same weight with that by a ‘formal member’; ND considers all individuals who turn up in the voting as ‘members’ and registers them with this capacity. Even if it is of secondary importance, the difference shows that PASOK is ‘pioneering’ in the substantive abolition of the party as a distinct, voluntary, politico-ideological organization.'
with its society. The goal of the creation of ‘democratic parties’ with an institutionalized participation of the base is totally discredited.

Thirdly, the party is abolished as a ‘collective intellectual’. Thus, it does not produce collective ideas and decisions, does not form its own political elite on the basis of these ideas, and resigns from any sense of programmatic political articulation of the social interests that it represents electorally. Paradoxically, the direct election of the President completes a course of anti-democratic diversion of the post-1974 party type.

From a particular constitutional standpoint, the view was expressed that the democratisation of the process of electing the leaders is identical to the broadening of the electoral body that is invited to vote, despite the fact that its application in the case of PASOK, which is used as a case-study, led to phenomena of concentration of party power (Anthopoulos & Kontiadis, 2008)

Our own approach is quite different. This is not only about the unfortunate application to PASOK of an otherwise right idea. In reality, open election arises as a continuation of the representative weakening of parties and their fading as collective organisations of social representation. It is a process that does not lead to the democratisation of parties, but rather certainly to the concentration of power.

Let us put forward some effects:

a) The direct election of the President establishes the ‘President’ as an autonomous and single-person party organ with increased legitimacy. This leads directly and absolutely to the concentration of party and executive power, which acts delinked from any sense of political legitimacy. The return of PASOK to the government in 2009, in exactly this very context, was accompanied by the economic and social policy of the ‘Memorandum’ and of its loan agreements, i.e. by an extreme policy of demolition of the welfare state and rights, which was decided, agreed and executed by a small team surrounding the Leader of the party and Prime Minister, in the absence of even the central political elite of PASOK.

b) The direct election of the President does not occur on the basis of a binding political and programmatic framework. The President is elected on the basis of the symbolisms that he or she represents in the interior of the party, while his/her programmatic positions and broader goals are implicit.

c) Intermediary organs are rendered useless, not only because they do not enjoy a political legitimacy of a similar intensity, but also because they are essentially and nominally placed ‘under’ the President. The hierarchical structure now acquires an organic character; it is not anymore a form of the function of an a priori centralist organization.

d) The direct election of the President abolishes the party as a venue for the co-formulation of political decisions and a field for the crystallization of social processes; in other words, it abolishes the basic precondition for the function of the ‘collective intellectual’ that is the party. It also cancels any possibility for co-articulating individual policies, a process that is considered critical even by the ‘functionalist’ theory of political parties.

Both the direct election of the President and the processes that accompany it lead to the transformation of the ‘mass party’ into a formal, purely electoral organisation. The mass element of the number of members has solely an electoral utility, towards either the party interior, or the electoral body. Towards the society, the party acts as a formal electoral
mechanism (without programmatic commitments, not even at the level of the electoral base), a fact that at the level of state administration allows the party to operate and be reproduced as part of an air-tight power cartel, together with other similarly established parties. Party members constitute an inactive mass of individualised interests while the party’s tops are occupied - substantively and formally - by a personnel that holds state-political positions.

The *en masse* turn-out at the open elections for the party’s President supports this finding. According to official party data, a few more than 1,000,000 citizens attended the election of the President of PASOK in 2004, while 765,000 attended the respective election of November 2007. The open election of the President of ND in November 2009 was attended by 782,136 citizens, while approximately 43,000 participated at the open election of the President of the party’s Youth (ONNED). These numbers are far from the number of party members that participate in any way in the usual fixed intra-party processes. This fact is a paradigm of ‘participatory democracy’ for the proponents of direct election. In fact, for all of the aforementioned reasons, this particular process highlights the downgrading, if not abolition, of the party as a voluntary social organisation, as a collective unifier of social relations of representation and as an agent for the ‘incorporation of interests’, as claimed by the classical functionalist theory of political parties (Hague & Harrop, 2005: 333). In contrast to the prevailing view, it also demonstrates the parallel upgrading of the party as a tool for the autonomisation of its ruling groups from binding social representation. The party is transposed into a mechanism for the consolidation of political legitimacy of choices and decisions that originate from the state.

This structural development essentially cancels parties as historical entities of social and class representation, and as bodies for the co-articulation of social interests. The party now constitutes a mechanism of mediation between state policies and the society, as well as a tool for the management and suspension of social pressures.

**Other forms of concentration of party power in ND and PASOK**

Nevertheless, the concentration of party power and the restriction of the influence of the party base are ensured through a series of other statutory arrangements, such as provisions for the composition of party Conferences. Let us clarify that the latter are considered by party statutes as the supreme party organs, with competences that are decisive as far as their programmatic and ideological position is concerned.

In ND, it should be observed that despite the fact that in the 1980s a huge increase in the mass element of the party occurred, the election of the leadership and the party organs continued by statute to concern a closed (restricted) number of electors (political cadres and parliamentarians). The party type never functioned bottom-up; it always worked the other way round. Up until the 4th Conference of the party in 1997, party conference was never the organ that elected the leadership and thus got to set the political program. The 4th Conference, where C. Karamanlis was elected, is formally the exception to the aforementioned rule. Essentially, this confirms the above rule since 1/3 of the conference participants was appointed.

From that point onwards, party conferences are quantitatively enlarged and democratically restricted. In fact, after the rise to power in 2004, the party becomes absolutely centralized, stiflingly controlled ‘top-down’ and essentially losing the last trace of democratic participation. At the 6th Conference, the ratio of elected-appointed
conference participants is reversed, with the latter comprising 2/3 of conference participants, when in 1997 they comprised almost 1/3 of them.

While reading article 10 of the current Statute of ND concerning the composition of the Conference of the party, one is confronted with a ‘diversion’ from any notion of a democratic party, with the participation of its base and the collective shaping of the political program. Essentially, the body of conference participants is an a priori appointed body that, under certain conditions, may even reach 90% of the number of conference participants. The Statute of the party ‘locks’ the ex officio participation of: a) the president of the party, b) former presidents, c) members of the Parliamentary Group and the European Parliament, d) members of the Central Committee, e) all party’s former members of the parliament and the European Parliament, f) all parliamentary candidates who did not manage to get elected, g) all former members of the Executive Committee and the Political Council h) all acting mayors, perfects and heads of provinces, i) elected representatives in Regional Councils and Municipal Councils, j) members of the Board of Directors of the scientific associations of the country, farmers’ cooperatives, chambers and employers’ organisations, as well as of secondary employees’ organisations. In its last version, the Statute of ND is a model of preventing the potential for penetration of the party organisation by uncontrollable demands or individuals.

Apart from the composition of the Conference, an equally stifling control is imposed on the election of the members of the Central Committee (or Political Committee in various periods). The party’s Central Committee that was elected at the 7th Conference (2007) totalled 550 members, out of whom only 150 (27%) were elected ones. At the 8th Conference of the party (2010), the Political Committee comprised 450 members, out of whom only 200 (44%) were elected. The rest were members ex officio: (members of the parliament, members of the European Parliament, elected mayors, members of professional or social organizations, etc.).

It is also interesting to note that the election of the organ does not take place through a single list of candidates, but rather through many different lists (e.g. women in Athens, representatives from the scientific field, representatives from thematic organizations, parliamentarians, etc.). The composition of the Central Committee is a gluing together of separate groups and groupings, without any cohesion between them, and without a single view or opinion. This is the collage of a fragmented social body, split among properties of gender, origin and profession.

The party structure of ND constitutes a model of ‘state party’ that uses its mass element - if any - as a mechanism of legitimization.

Similar organizational policies have been adopted by PASOK as well. In fact, the last Statute that was voted in the 8th Conference in 2008 institutionalised the limitation of the representation of the party base and the safeguarding of the ‘autonomies’ of party leadership.

Therefore, the presence of representatives from the base in party Conferences is institutionally set to be double the number of merit-based participants. This statutory ‘locked’ number means that the Conference of PASOK consists of representatives from the base.

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7 As the Statute of PASOK states in Art. 32: ‘Members that are elected and represent all organizations of the Movement participate at the Conference. Their number is double the number of ex-officio Conference participants’.
base up to 66% while merit-based representatives reach approximately 33%.\textsuperscript{8} The following individuals participate at the Conference of PASOK ‘due to their position or capacity’, as stated by the Statute: a) current members of the National Council, b) members of a National Representation of the PASOK Youth, c) acting prefects and mayors and the heads of prefectoral and municipal groupings of prefecture capitals and large municipalities who are members of PASOK, d) presidents of tertiary and secondary trade union associations, cooperative societies and sports clubs, chambers, as well as of the Union of Prefectural Authorities and the Central Union of Municipalities and Local Communities who are members of PASOK, e) members of non-governmental organisations that have been accredited by the Committee of Statute and Accreditation (EKAP) following a decision by the National Council, f) former members of the parliament and the European Parliament, who are still members of PASOK, g) former members of the Central Committee and the National Council of the Movement, h) the secretaries and deputy secretaries of Prefectural and Sectoral Committees, i) members of PASOK who signed the Founding Declaration of 3rd September.

In reality, the Conference transforms into a broad plenary session - meeting of whoever has or has had a more active involvement with politics through PASOK.

With the statutory enactments after 2004, the old ‘Central Committee’ of PASOK is replaced by the ‘National Council’. This development was accompanied by a large quantitative enlargement of that particular body. Traditionally, the Central Committee of PASOK was relatively small, since it was a decisive organ for the political line of the party. In early 1990s, it consists of 140 members, while a few years later its members are 180. The first ‘innovation’ introduced after 2004 is the massive quantitative enlargement of the National Council. It is well known from the theory of organisations that the quantitative enlargement of an organ is usually inversely proportional to its political weight. The larger a party organ is, the more slow-moving and dysfunctional it becomes, resulting to a decrease in its political function. And this principle seems to be followed by the book by the leading group of PASOK after 2004.

The exact number of the members of the National Council is not stated in the Statute. This is natural, as any researcher of the party’s Statute may observe, given that the composition of that organ is largely pre-appointed in advance and disassociated from the Conference of the party. According to the 2008 Statute, the National Council comprises the following individuals \textit{ex officio}: a) the president of the Party (who is elected neither by the party Conference, not by the ‘formal party’), b) former prime-ministers, and party presidents and secretaries, c) members of the parliament and the European Parliament, d) secretaries of Regional Committees and the Inter-Sectoral Committee, e) the secretary and the Coordinating Committee of the party’s Youth, f) the presidents of tertiary trade unions and cooperative societies, chambers, the Union of Prefectural Authorities and the Central Union of Municipalities and Local Communities, as well as one member of a tertiary sports organ, g) the presidents of ISTAME and the Institute of Further Education.

To the sum of all the aforementioned merit-based members corresponds an \textit{equal number of members elected by the Conference}. In other words, if in the composition of the Conference the number of merit-based members reaches 33%, the respective

\textsuperscript{8} In order to have a comparative picture of the difference in the composition of the Conference, it is worth noting that the merit-based members at the 3rd Conference of PASOK (1994) were almost 150 in a total of 4,459 conference participants (approximately 3.3%) and at the 4th Conference (1996) there were almost 250 in a total of 5,200 conference participants (4.8%).
percentage of merit-based members in the National Council reaches 50%. Therefore, the number of the members of this organ depends on the number of merit-based members, which logically increases as years pass by. In 2009, there were 404 members of the National Council of PASOK; the number was more than double, almost triple, the number of the members of the old Central Committee.

Changes in the function of the party’s organization are in the direction of stifling concentration of (party) power. The liquefaction of the party into a mechanism of party cadres without an ideological shaft is complete by the end of the 2000s, with the total transformation of PASOK into a ‘party of the state’ that realizes policies without social and party legalization.

The financing of parties as an indicator of their social autonomy or dependence from the state

A crucial issue acting as a catalyst on the politico-organisational type of contemporary political parties is related to their public financing, private financing - which depends heavily on the former - and self-financing (i.e. financing from members, friends and the society more generally).

Historically, the first political parties were financed exclusively by their members, their social base and their voters. Public financing in most European political systems was institutionalized in post-war decades, while in Greece the first institutional arrangement can be found in Law 1443 of 1984. Since then, three other laws followed: Law 2429 of 1996, Law 2817 of 2000 and Law 3023 of 2002. The distance between the first law in 1984 and the last one in 2002 is great. The first law spoke of financing the electoral expenses of the parties. Gradually, however, public financing extended to the parties’ entire operating expenditure, both during the parliamentary tenure and the electoral campaign. Questions, such as how much the operating expenses of a party are, how much they should be, how their level should be decided upon, as well as whether there is a maximum limit that they can reach and what that limit is, are not answered by the legislation governing state financing.

State financing completes institutionally the incorporation of political parties in the public institutional system. In the process of their (total or partial) mutation from agents of social representation to institutions of legitimization of state policies in society, state financing adds the economic factor to the state-party relationship. In the environment of modern ‘professional politics’ that has more and more weakened modern parties as ‘voluntary unions of citizens’ turning them into a kind of ‘enterprise’, one understands that state financing is essentially what preserves parties financially. In other words, it constitutes the institutional guarantor of the dependence of parties on the state and, moreover, a strategic tool for the ‘top-down’ control of the political system. Through

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\[10\]

\[11\]
the financing and the economic concentration that is imposed, organized disagreement within parties is stiffly restricted, while the capacity for forming and developing alternative, non-systemic parties or even displeasing political initiatives is largely prevented. A large part of the social base is pushed out of the parties, to the extent that the latter turn to the state, rather than to society, for resources. State budget undertakes to maintain the parties, as it (almost) does with each and every repressive or ideological or welfare mechanism at its disposal (education, police and army, justice, health, etc.).

Older proponents of state financing of the parties believed that this constituted a mechanism for the safeguard of popular rule, since it ensured (or at least it was supposed to ensure) the free competition of the parties under equal conditions. It was believed that ‘the private financing of the political parties is directed from the economic forces towards the party or parties that hold the majority or are close to it. The state apparatus always functions in favour of the party in government’ (Tsatsos, 1982: 245). This view put forward the argument that state financing would ‘protect’ these parties from dependencies on private economic interests that are dangerous for the political regime, while also consolidating equality in political competition and thus deepening democracy.

Unfortunately, the evolution of things refuted Tsatsos’ ‘democratic constitutionalism’. Not only did state financing not obstruct the relations between parties and private economic interests, but on the contrary, it multiplied them. This was due to two reasons: Firstly, because state financing - which was increasing year after year, constantly extended the operating needs of the parties, resulting in a constant insufficiency of state support. Thus, the more operating needs grew, the more party deficits widened, fuelling recourse to private capitals. Finally, the following oxymoron scheme appeared: dependence from private interests grew parallel to the growth of state financing.

Secondly, the evolution of parties into sole agencies for the planning and realization of state policy eventually turned parties into institutional mediators between the state and economic interests. This crucial placement of the parties within the system of power, in a neoliberal conjuncture when the policies for the lessening of the state and an expansion of the role of the markets had begun to dominate the scene, rendered parties the epicentre of institutional corruption. Several major economic scandals that occurred after the 1990s in the US, in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Japan and, of course, Greece (Siemens, Athens Stock Exchange, Vatopedi Monastery, structured bonds, military equipment acquisition, etc.) pointed to the ruling parties as a privileged venue for the development of relations between the economy and politics, and the submission of the latter to the interests of business groups.12

However, state financing had another serious effect, this time in the field of party structure, and especially of intra-party democracy. (Increasing) state financing ended up further strengthening party centralism and the tendencies towards (economic) autonomy displayed by each party ‘ruling class’. This happened exactly because state financing was directed solely to the tops (i.e. to the leaderships) of the parties - and was not diffused in

12 This reality was legitimized a posteriori, as is almost always the case with the legal system, by the legislative initiative of Law 3023/2002. While public funding was initially established in order to prevent relations between the parties and private capital, this law recognized the exact opposite: ‘The financing of political parties should remain public and private. The legislator must strike a balance between these two sources of funding […]. The abolition of private financing would render parties ‘state-fed’ and would distance them from society and the citizens (Recommendation for Law 3023/2002).
its organisational pyramid - while at the same time no rights were granted to simple party members or organisations to control party finances. Therefore, state financing did not support the party as a ‘collective organisation’ (i.e. the presence of the party in an area or the development of bottom-up social initiatives, which would strengthen the social materiality of the party and would provide simple members with the capacity to participate at intra-party life at a much larger scale) but rather as a ‘bureaucratic mechanism’. Gradually, an administrative-clerical (party) bureaucracy was established, which began to act and think as an independent interest group. This bureaucracy helped render the parties (ruling parties in particular) de-ideologised entities without a political plan and definitely without an effectiveness criterion for public interest.

Such a development altered entirely the notion of the party: from a voluntary union of equal citizens for the achievement of a common goal, it was transformed into an economic-administrative mechanism for the fulfilment of its own interests. In practice, in recent years we witnessed a particular process, as demonstrated in the aforementioned case of PASOK with the fake registrations of members: citizens shaking off the status of the (conscious and active) party member and ruling parties officially displaying hundreds of thousands of members by ‘buying up’ party cards with money from the public (or private) financing. The game of (intra-party) power was essentially played with money of the state and capital.

Therefore, the issue of financing and economic resources of parties constitute one of the most critical issues surrounding the function of contemporary political systems. State financing constitutes a powerful indicator for measuring a party’s dependence on the state, or the lack of it. Private financing - and we obviously refer to the private financing from large capital - constitutes a powerful indicator for measuring a party’s dependence on capital. Finally, financing from the ‘party’s society’ (members, friends, supporters, independent voters, etc.) constitutes a powerful indicator for measuring the social autonomy of the party.

If, theoretically, modern political parties are the outcome of the co-articulation of two dynamic and often opposing processes, social representation and production of state policies, the sources for pumping out financial resources point to the direction a party tends to follow organisationally: whether it tends to become an institution of ‘social representation’ or a mechanism of ‘public management’ in favour of capital.

Let us now see what the political parties of the period under study ‘tell’ about their financing and eventually about their party type, through the balance sheets that they disclose annually. From the study of the published balance sheets of the last fifteen years, it is observed that their financial resources are generally drawn from five large categories: a)

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13 In order to leave no room for doubt, Law 3023/2002 made sure to clarify it on Art. 29 (which refers to the ‘Founding, legal personality and removal of disagreements over the use of the name and emblem of a political party’), Par. 7, stating that: ‘In the case of disagreement over the use of the name and the emblem of a political party […], the party that had notified authorities with the submission of its founding declaration and used them according to common perception is recognized as the party entitled to the use of the respective name and emblem’.

14 According to legislation (Art. 18, Law 3023/2002), the political parties that receive state funding are obliged to publish a balance sheet annually, during the first two months of each year, on at least two daily newspapers of Athens. The drafting of the balance sheet must correspond to the rules and structures of the General Accountancy Plan and the relevant regulatory acts that govern its application.
state funding, b) economic contribution / subscription of their members, c) bank loans, d) revenues from the exploitation of property or party companies, and e) contributions by members of the parliament / European parliament and extraordinary economic campaigns. Out of these five categories, only the second one constitutes an indicator of social participation per se. Potentially, the fifth category could also fall under the banner of social participation as far as the segment of economic campaigns is concerned, yet this element is usually unclear since the category of ‘economic campaigns’ may mask large economic contributions by powerful (institutional or individual) actors.

Table 1 registers the share of public financing in the annual collected revenues of the parties. Bank loans are not included in the category ‘collected revenues’; in balance sheets, loans are included in the more general category of ‘revenues’.

### TABLE 1: 
SHARE OF PARTICIPATION OF PUBLIC FINANCING IN THE COLLECTED REVENUES OF THE MAIN GREEK POLITICAL PARTIES, 1997-2007 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PASOK</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>59.0 15-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Percentage of the Period: 81.6, 74.7, 55.0, 81.3

*Source:* Data analysis of Published Revenues/Expenses Balance Sheet of the political parties by Ch. Vernardakis

The main conclusion that can be drawn is that three parties (PASOK, SYN, ND) are almost equally dependent on public financing. Even for KKE, the respective source accounts for the majority of its revenues.

Another such study in 1993 showed that the share of state financing in total revenues of PASOK and ND for the period 1985-1992 reached an average of 45.3% and 45.4% respectively (Drettakis 1993b). For KKE, the respective share reached 12.6% while for the then unified Synaspismos of the period 1989-1992 the share of public financing reached 35.2% of revenues. Compared to these percentages, one observes a doubling of

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15 The decrease of the share of state financing in the revenues of SYN in 2006 is fictitious, since a part that goes to the other forces of the SYRIZA coalition has been deducted from the total calculated sum. So, while the total sum of public subsidy for 20006 reaches 3.044.609,21 Euros, 456.691,38 Euros are absorbed by the other coalition members and 2.587.917,83 by SYN.
the share of state’s participation for PASOK and ND, and a more-than-tripling for the parties of the Left.

The following Table 2 presents the share of participation of organized members and party organizations in the total collected revenues of the parties. Here, as was the case with the previous table, the share is calculated based on ‘collected revenues’ and not on ‘revenues’ in general (which include bank loans as well). If the calculation were based on ‘revenues’, percentages would be much smaller, almost inexistent.

TABLE 2:
SHARE OF PARTICIPATION OF THE PARTY BASE IN THE COLLECTED REVENUES OF THE PARTIES, 1997-2007 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PASOK</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1992)</td>
<td>(12.2)</td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
<td>(54.7)</td>
<td>(22.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>? 16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average percentage 1997-2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PASOK</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Data analysis of Published Revenues/Expenses Balance Sheet of the political parties by Ch. Vernardakis

Data from the balance sheets shows that the growing economic dependence of political parties on state financing rendered members’ participation entirely formal. As shown in Table 2, the participation of organized party base in the finances of the parties is rather unimportant, if existent at all. Surely, there is a (minor) share in party revenues attributed to the category ‘economic campaigns’. However, it is not at all clear whether this category includes contributions from party members and supporters alone, or also contributions by economic actors, businesses, etc.

In any case, this development is contrary to the spirit of at least the initial party statutes (Papadimitriou & Spourdalakis, 1994). 17 All parties declare in the relevant

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16 In the 1998 published balance sheet of KKE, the sum that originates from ‘contributions by members - party organisations’ is not stated separately, but rather merged in a single category that includes ‘contributions by members, parliamentarians, retired parliamentarians, and friends of the party’. In later balance sheets, the registering was differentiated according to each category.

17 Article 68 of the Statute of PASOK (1990) defines the following as economic resources of the party: a) members’ subscriptions, b) extra-ordinary contributions by members, c) contributions by friends of the party, donations and inheritances that are only accepted after a decision by the party
chapters that their resources come primarily from the contributions of their members and the economic campaigns that they wage from time to time. Furthermore, they define and entrench the notion of party member in direct connection with his/her participation in support of the party. The fact that in 2000, the percentage of members’ contributions reaches zero, shows the divergence from the ‘typical’ form of the parties: from a social institution of representation, (a tool of its members and volunteers that constitute it, corresponding to the ‘typical’ definition of the party), it is transformed through public financing in an institution of state dependence.

The limited economic participation of party members began to appear clearly (and be noted) since the beginning of the 1990s. In 1992, contributions by ND represented 3.7% of total revenues. For PASOK, the respective percentage was 12.2%, for SYN 22.6% and for KKE 54.7% (Ta Nea, 21-5-1993).

In recent years, another source of revenues has been added to the political parties’ toolbox: bank lending. In fact, in many cases state financing would be mortgaged as a guarantee for the bank. Table 3 registers the share of bank loans in total party revenues.

**TABLE 3:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PASOK</th>
<th>ND</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Data analysis of Published Revenues/Expenses Balance Sheet of the political parties by Ch. Vernardakis.

organs, d) proceeds from events and activities, and e) earnings from the annual renewal of the membership card. The fact that there is no reference to state financing is truly impressive. Article 51 of the Statute of KKE mentions state financing as the last resource; the order in which the various resources are stated is the following: members’ subscriptions, corporate activities, donations and inheritances, sales of printed material, economic campaigns, deduction of a percentage from salaries and indemnities provided to elected public officials and, finally, state financing. Article 29 of the Statute of ND (as approved at the 3rd Conference in 1994) defines the regular resources of the party as follows: a) state financing, b) subscriptions of party members, parliamentarians and members of the European Parliament, and c) earnings from the party’s property. Finally, the Statute of SYN (1992) sets the party’s sources of funding in the following order: a) subscriptions and contributions by members and friends, b) percentages from the salaries of MPs and MEPs, c) economic campaigns, and d) state subsidies. All initial Statutes of the post-1974 parties are found in Papadimitriou & Spourdalakis (1994).
Sums that stem from bank lending differ from year to year, since parties do not borrow the same sums every year. Therefore, it is not totally right to export an average share of bank lending in the revenues of each party, while it should also be acknowledged that the servicing of older loans lies heavy on the parties’ expenses.

However, the banks’ participation in the financial revenues of political parties is a steady reality. There are years, such as 2007 for PASOK or 2004 for ND, when the share of bank lending in party finances is decisive. To a large - but not to the same - extent, the same trend is observable for the two parties of the Left.

The entire picture of the financing of political parties shows that they depend economically, and almost entirely, by state financing and private (bank) lending. The economic contributions of their members are either small or inexistent, while the revenues from economic campaigns represent a generally small percentage; note that no data is provided concerning the number and identity of contributors as well as the level of each individual contribution (we refer to large donations over 600 Euros, which the parties must publicise by law. In published balance sheets, a notable part of revenues for all parties comes from contributions by members of the parliament and the European Parliament. Of course, there is the peculiar case of KKE, which is the only party that registers in its balance sheets small but notable revenues from ‘property exploitation’ (indicatively: 2.5% of total revenues in 2005 and 2006, 2% in 2007, 1.6% in 2001, 1.7% in 1998), which does not however alter the general picture.

**Some conclusions: The organizational type of the Greek parties post-1974 as ‘cartel party’**

At this point, we may sum up our conclusions drawn from the previous sections.

Based on the analysis of their political and organizational type, the parties of the ‘late period’ of political changeover after 1974 are divided into two main categories: the ruling parties, on the one hand, and the parties of the Left, on the other.

This division is dictated by the fact that the two categories of parties each share common structural features. To begin with, the ruling parties of PASOK and ND are almost identical in three basic points:

The **first** point is that, after the 1990s, they have adopted the same organizational policy that seeks an increasing autonomy of the tops and a statutory (institutional) reduction of the organized base in all political party processes. The two parties institutionalize the ‘direct-open’ election of their president, the reduction or even the abolition of the role and the position of their intermediary political bodies, and the ‘appointment’ of their party conferences through a recycling party-political elite. The compositions of their main party organs (National Councils, Central Committees, etc.), stripped of any competences, resemble corporatist parliaments with air-tight partial representations. Their members are ‘formal’ and, in essence, their ‘mass element’ is restricted solely to elections. The tools that they use are almost exclusively the tools of professional politics.

The **second** point is the growing interweaving of parties and the state, as far as their anthropogeographic composition is concerned. Their primary political organs are ‘nationalised’. Indicators of interrelation with the state are extremely powerful, showing that almost the entire range of high-level cadre structure exercises some form of public political duties.
The third element is the parties’ economic dependence on the state and on private sources of financing, such as banks. Their function as a typical professional bureaucracy has critically decreased social voluntary contribution and has thus turned ruling parties into organic ‘branches’ of the state and of banking capital. The (indicative) question, of how a party that survives on state financing and mortgages it to the banks in order to secure greater loans can follow a policy of restricting and controlling bank unaccountability, is therefore totally rhetorical.

The parties of the Left (KKE and SYN) comprise the second category of parties. They are bodies that attempt - not always successfully - to oppose the ‘state party’ type as defined by the two ruling parties. The party type of the ruling parties is dominant - since it reflects broader social and political relations, as is the case with every form of organization - and is clearly hegemonic over the structure of the remaining party types.

On the one hand, the parties of the Left are based on an authentic social, voluntary mobilization; on the other hand, they also display intense elements of ‘statisation’ that make them differ from the ruling parties while also resembling them partly.

Compared to the ruling parties, the parties of the Left differ clearly over the first point, i.e. their organizational policy. They have not abandoned the notion of the party as a bearer of the representation of social interests and they have not succumbed - at least until now - to the postmodernism of the ‘open party’ or the ‘network-party’. This, however, does not mean that they too are bureaucracies or that they are not characterized by significant bureaucratic deviations. Especially in KKE, the tradition of bureaucratic centralism is evident and long-standing, while SYN is characterized by a strong culture of organizational liberalism that renders the party an entity without discipline, often dominated by personal strategies. Undoubtedly, the parties of the Left are far from being considered democratic, in the full meaning of the word; nevertheless, they continue to be organisationally substantive, representative entities, rather than sums of public interest groups.

They partly differ from ruling parties as far as the second point is concerned. They are not ‘parties of the state’, in the sense of their organic connection to bearers of state positions.

On the third point, the parties of the Left coincide with the ruling parties. Their financial resources come largely from public financing and bank loans. Their social autonomy is thus limited, a fact which has up to now rendered them a secondary but essential part of the politico-economic system.

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